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1 Introduction
Media is crucial to society both in terms of economic importance and its
impact on information ows. The latter issue has recently been reconsidered
in a variety of papers in order to shed more light on how the media industry
works. A recent string of papers, for example, has looked at what determines
the accuracy of reporting (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005, and Gentzkow
and Shapiro, 2006, 2008) and how the media industry inuences voting de-
cisions (Strömberg, 2004, and Della Vigna and Kaplan, 2007). In this paper
we turn to a di¤erent aspect of the media sector, namely how taxes inuence
market behavior of media rms. The media industry is subject to preferen-
tial tax treatment in many countries. Newspapers, for example, are typically
taxed at a reduced rate or completely exempted from value-added taxation.1
The reason for this is that governments consider newspapers to be an essen-
tial channel for disseminating vital information about e.g. culture, politics,
and international a¤airs. Thus the public policy measures undertaken have
aimed to stimulate high circulation and low prices.
In what we refer to as normal or one-sided markets, it is well known that
reducing the ad valorem tax, say, lowers the consumer price and increases
output. 2 However, we show that this need not apply for the newspaper
industry and other platforms that operate in so-called two-sided markets.
Two-sided platform rms cater to two distinct groups of customers that
are connected through quantity spillovers, and the rms maximize prot
by facilitating value-creating interactions between these groups. Two-sided
platforms operate in many economically signicant industries, such as the
media sector, the nancial sector (payment card systems), real-estate bro-
kerage, and the computing industry (computer operating systems, software,
1In Germany, newspapers are subject to a rate of 7% (19% is the regular rate) while
in e.g. the UK, Denmark, and Norway they are exempted from value-added taxation
all together (European Commission, 2004). Newspapers are also either fully or partially
exempted from sales taxes in a number of U.S. states.
2An overview of the tax incidence literature is given by Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
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game consoles etc.). The pricing strategies of a platform rm must account
for interactions between the demands of di¤erent customer groups and the
externalities that arise in these relationships.3 For instance, in the media
industry, advertising may be perceived as a nuisance (a negative external-
ity) or a benet (a positive externality) by readers/viewers, while advertisers
benet from an increase in readers/viewers of the media outlet. In the credit
card industry there are positive quantity spillovers between merchants and
cardholders. Merchants who accept a credit card welcome an increase in the
number of households joining the credit card system, and vice versa.4
We show that the sign, size and direction of externalities in two-sided
markets are decisive for the e¤ects of changes in ad valorem tax rates. Specif-
ically, an increase in the ad valorem tax in one side of the market a¤ects the
relative protability between the two markets, such that a rm will want
to shift its earnings to the side where the tax rate is unchanged. By doing
so it reduces the burden of the tax increase. Contrary to what one might
expect, this may involve increasing output and reducing prices on both sides
of the market. The platform may thus decide not to shift taxes via price
increases. Our analysis consequently has implications for the understanding
of tax incidence in two-sided markets.
The behavior of the platform rm in response to a tax increase in one side
of the market can be illustrated by a media rm. A media rm is a two-sided
platform that derives income from selling a newspaper and advertisements,
and where the income from advertisements depends positively on newspaper
sales. An increase in the ad valorem tax rate on the newspaper may induce
the media rm to rely more on income from advertisements. Thus, it may
reduce the price of the newspaper in order to attract more readers. A larger
readership means that the newspaper becomes more attractive for the ad-
vertisers, and the media rm may therefore end up selling more of both ads
3Evans (2003a,b) provides examples and classications of two-sided markets.
4As will become clear in the discussion below, it is important to distinguish the concept
of two-sided markets from that of complementarities. See also Rochet and Tirole (2003).
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and newspapers following a tax increase. We show that this is particularly
likely to be true if newspaper readers consider ads as a nuisance (rather than
as a complement which increases the intrinsic value of the media product).
A very high tax on newspapers could even lead a media platform to provide
the newspaper free of charge and rely on income from advertising only.
Our analysis is related to a growing literature on Industrial Organization
that analyzes the price-setting behavior of rms in two-sided markets. In this
literature a key result is that two-sided platform rms may nd it protable
to charge prices that are below marginal cost or even negative for one of
its product (customer group).5 This is in contrast to conventional markets
(one-sided) where marginal cost equal to marginal revenue pricing is well es-
tablished as a guidance. In such markets the e¤ects of taxation are well known
both under perfect and imperfect competition. Under imperfect competition
a tax can be overshifted onto the consumer side in certain circumstances,
but, in general, the burden of the tax is shared between producers and con-
sumers depending on elasticities of supply and demand.6 Except for Kind
et al. (2008), who analyze tax policy in a monopoly market, the literature
on two-sided platforms does not consider taxation issues. This paper di¤ers
from Kind et al. in various ways, however. For instance, while they look at
the e¢ cient choice of taxes, we focus on the issue of tax incidence in two-
sided markets. More fundamentally, in the present paper we also consider
duopolistic competition. This allows us to analyze how taxes a¤ect media
pluralism. Specically, we show that increasing the ad valorem tax may un-
dermine a newspapers incentive to di¤erentiate its content from that of its
competitors. Interestingly, a higher specic tax may have the opposite e¤ect.
In contrast, it is well known that neither ad valorem nor specic taxes tend
to a¤ect di¤erentiation incentives in one-sided markets.
5See for instance Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Anderson
and Coate (2005), Armstrong (2006) and Crampes, Haritchabalet and Jullien (2005)
6See Keen and Delipalla (1992), Dierickx, Matutes and Neven (1998) and Anderson et.
al. (2001a,b), and Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for a survey.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the basic
model, while Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of an ad valorem tax on prices
in monopoly. Section 4 carries out an analysis with respect to specic taxes.
Section 5 analyzes the e¤ects of taxes in duopoly, and section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a two-sided monopoly platform which sells good N at price pN to
one group of customers and good A at price pA to another group of customers.
Let n and a denote the respective quantities of the two goods.
We assume that both customer groups are price takers. The inverse de-
mand function for each good is downward-sloping in own quantity; pNn 
@pN=@n < 0; pAa  @pA=@a < 0 (subscripts henceforth denote partial deriva-
tives). The willingness to pay for each good may also depend on how much
is sold of the other good. The sale of good A imposes a positive externality
on buyers of good N if the willingness to pay for N is increasing in output of
good A (pNa > 0) and a negative externality if p
N
a < 0.
7 In the same manner,
good N may impose a positive (pAn > 0) or negative (p
A
n < 0) externality on
the demand for good A. The inverse demand functions can thus be written as
pN = pN(n; a) and pA = pA(n; a). We resort to a partial equilibrium analysis
by abstracting from other determinants of demand.
For the sake of convenience, and to emphasize the economic intuition and
policy relevance of our results, we shall in what follows relate our model and
results to a media rm (the platform). A newspaper is a typical example of
a two-sided platform rm, which derives income from two distinct customer
groups (newspaper readers and advertisers), and where there are externalities
between the two groups (possibly positive from readers to advertisers, and
negative from advertisers to readers). In such a setting we may interpret n
as sales of newspapers, and a as sales of advertising space to rms.
7This is an externality since producers and consumers are price takers. Thus, they do
not take into account the e¤ect of their actions on the demand in either side of the market.
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An ad valorem tax (t) is levied on sales of newspapers (good N); which
implies that the media rm receives the price pN= (1 + t) per copy it sells
of the newspaper. The tax rate t may deviate from the general VAT rate t
which for simplicity is set to 0. Our focal point here is to examine the e¤ects
of a change in the tax rate t; holding t xed.
The newspaper (the platform) has the following prot level:
 = max
n;a

apA(a; n) +
npN(n; a)
1 + t
  k (n; a)

; (1)
where k (n; a) is the cost function, with ki  0 (i = a; n) and kna R 0.
The rst-order condition for good A (a = 0) implies

pA + apAa
  ka =   npNa
1 + t
: (2)
The squared bracket in equation (2) measures marginal revenue on the ad-
vertising side of the market of selling more ads. In the prot maximizing
optimum in a one-sided market this term is equal to marginal cost (ka) so
that the left-hand side would be zero. However, in a two-sided market there
is an additional term (right-hand side) that captures the fact that the sales of
advertising (good A) may inuence the sales of newspapers (good N): This
term is positive if the demand for newspapers is decreasing in the level of
advertising (that is, pNa < 0); while it is negative if advertising imposes a pos-
itive externality on demand for newspapers: In the former case, the level of
advertising should be set lower than the level that maximizes prot in the ad-
vertising market in isolation (i.e., in a one-sided market), while the opposite
is true if a larger advertising volume increases the demand for newspapers.
From the rst-order condition for good N (n = 0); we likewise nd that
pN + npNn
1 + t

  kn =  apAn : (3)
The squared bracket is marginal revenue from selling the newspaper (good
N) to consumers, and would in optimum be equal to kn in a one-sided mar-
ket (i.e., when pAn = 0): However, if demand for ads is higher the larger
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the number of readers (pAn > 0), prot is maximized by raising the sale of
newspapers beyond the volume that maximizes prot on newspaper sales in
isolation (and vice versa for pAn < 0).
From the rst-order conditions we see that equilibrium prices and quanti-
ties on both sides of the market depend on the tax rate. Since pA = pA(a; n)
and pN = pN(n; a); the price changes subsequent to a tax increase are given
by
dpA
dt
= pAa
da
dt
+ pAn
dn
dt
; and
dpN
dt
= pNn
dn
dt
+ pNa
da
dt
: (4)
We shall assume that the second-order conditions for prot maximization
hold, which means that aa < 0; nn < 0; and H  aann   2an > 0. In
order to simplify the following discussion we further state:
Assumption: Let pAn > 0 and an > 0.
The assumption that pAn > 0 seems reasonable in our context, since it
implies that the advertisers have a higher willingness to pay for ads the
larger is the readership of the newspaper. We might also have pNa > 0; in
which case the willingness to pay for a newspaper is increasing in the ad
volume. However, empirical evidence is inconclusive as to whether consumers
consider advertising to be a good or a bad.8 We shall therefore not make any
assumptions regarding the sign of pNa :
The assumption an > 0 ensures that the marginal protability for the
media rm of selling advertising space is increasing in the newspaper circu-
lation.
It should be emphasized that the model is applicable to two-sided markets
in general, and that our mathematical derivations and results also hold for
pAn  0 (in which case two-sidedness requires pNa > 0) and/or an  0:9 In
the Appendix we discuss how to interpret our results if an < 0:
8Readers in European countries seem to be averse to advertising ( see Ferguson 1983,
p. 637; Blair and Romano 1993, and Sonnac 2000) For retail advertising there is some
evidence showing that American readers like advertising.
9Evans (2003b) denes a two-sided market as one where we have (a) two distinct groups
of customers, (b) positive network externalities (at least from one of the customer groups to
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3 Prot-maximizing platform responses to a
tax increase
It is evident from our discussion above that the e¤ect of a change in the ad
valorem tax depends on assumptions linked to the externalities between the
two customer groups. Our analysis should not be confused with the standard
theory of complements. Complements are used to describe a situation where
an increase in the price of one good causes a decline in consumption of both
goods, measured by the change in the compensated demand by a single con-
sumer (see e.g., Kreps 1990, p. 61). This is di¤erent from a two-sided market,
where there are two distinct groups of customers that may respond di¤er-
ently to changes in prices (see Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) for a general
discussion). Also, the main results of our analysis do not hinge on the goods
being complementary in demand by the two groups of customers. In order to
see this as simply as possible, we start out by considering a situation where
newspaper readers are indi¤erent about the advertising level:
3.1 Consumers indi¤erent to the ad level (pNa = 0)
There is no externality from good A to good N if newspaper readers are
indi¤erent to the advertising level: Therefore the advertising level (i.e., output
of good A) does not a¤ect the willingness to pay for newspapers. In this case
we have that pNa = 0: The e¤ect of a higher value-added tax can be found
by using (4) and totally di¤erentiating rst order conditions (2) and (3). We
then obtain10
dn
dt

pNa =0
=
 aa
 
apAn   kn

H (1 + t)
;
dpN
dt

pNa =0
= pNn
dn
dt

pNa =0
(5)
and
the other), and (c) an intermediary that internalizes the externalities between the groups.
See Rochet and Tirole (2004) for a more formal denition.
10The full derivation is stated in the Appendix.
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da
dt

pNa =0
=
an
 
apAn   kn

H (1 + t)
(6)
Equations (5) and (6) show that we may get the seemingly paradoxi-
cal result that a higher VAT on newspapers reduces the end-user price of
that good and increases sales on both sides of the market. This happens if 
apAn   kn

> 0. To see why, recall that the willingness to pay for advertising
increases by pAn units if the newspaper attracts one more reader. With a total
advertising volume equal to a; the value for the newspaper of attracting one
extra reader equals apAn : If the size of this indirect network e¤ect is greater
than the marginal cost kn of serving one extra reader, it is protable for the
media rm to charge a lower price for the newspaper subsequent to the tax
increase.11 Thereby the readership increases, allowing the media rm to sell
more advertising and make a higher prot than if it increased the price and
reduced the output of newspapers.12
Whether apAn   kn > 0 holds depends on the industry in question. In
our media example there are high xed cost of creating the rst copy of a
newspaper, but relatively low marginal cost of reproducing it (and on the
internet kn is approximately equal to zero even for pay-to-view sites). It
should further be noted that advertising is the primary or only source of
income for some media outlets, indicating that apAn is relatively high.
The results in equations (5) and (6) are in stark contrast to benchmark
results in one-sided markets, from which it is well known that (i) consumers
buy less of a taxed good if marginal costs are positive (kn > 0), and that
11Di¤erentiating the equilibrium value of equation (1) with respect to t, and using the
envelope theorem, we nd d=dt =  pN (n; a)n(1 + t) 2 < 0 so the prot level is strictly
decreasing in the tax rate. However, the marginal change in prots earned in the ad market
is
 
pAa a+ p
A

da=dt+ pAn dn=dt which, by (2) and p
A
n > 0, is positive if quantity responses
are positive (i.e., apAn   kn > 0).
12To see the intuition for this result as clearly as possible, assume that t approaches
innity. Obviously, the newspaper would then have no reason to charge a positive consumer
price. However, it can still raise revenue through the advertising market and give the
newspaper away for free.
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(ii) an ad valorem tax is e¤ectively a tax on pure prot with no e¤ect on
output if marginal costs are zero (kn = 0) : Contrary to a rm operating in
a one-sided market, a two-sided platform rm can reduce its tax burden by
shifting revenue to the side of the market where the tax rate is unchanged.
This is particularly protable if the marginal costs of the more heavily taxed
good are smaller than the size of the indirect network e¤ect. In such a case
our results demonstrate that consumers of the more heavily taxed good buy
more of the good at a lower price. Thus, the platform does not shift even
part of the burden onto the buyers.
The e¤ect of the tax increase on the price of ads is from equation (4)
given by
dpA
dt

pNa =0
= pAa
da
dt

pNa =0
+ pAn
dn
dt

pNa =0
R 0:
Since pA(n; a) is downward-sloping in own quantity, an increase in the
advertising volume tends to reduce pA (pAa < 0). At the same time, the rm
can charge a higher advertising price if the size of the readership increases
(since pAn > 0). Consequently, it is uncertain whether the price of advertising
will go up or down.
3.2 Newspaper readers dislike ads (pNa < 0)
When pNa < 0; the demand for newspapers (good N) depends negatively
on the advertising level (good A). One might think that higher value-added
taxes are more likely to reduce the sales of newspapers the more consumers
dislike ads (since tax-motivated increased sales of ads would reduce demand
for newspapers). However, total di¤erentiation of equations (2) and (3) makes
it clear that the opposite is true:
da
dt

pNa <0
=
da
dt

pNa =0
+

1
1 + t
2 +z }| {
nnnp
N
a
H
(7)
10
dn
dt

pNa <0
=
dn
dt

pNa =0
+

1
1 + t
2 +z }| {
( annpNa )
H
: (8)
The rst term in (7) and (8) shows how advertising and newspaper sales
respond to a tax increase if consumers are indi¤erent about ads (pNa = 0).
As argued above, this term may be positive or negative. The second term,
though, is unambiguously positive and increasing in the consumersdisutility
of ads. The reason is that if sales in the newspaper market are adversely
a¤ected by advertising (pNa < 0) the media rm has incentives to set a smaller
advertising level than the volume which maximizes prot in the advertising
market (c.f. equation (2)). However, this incentive becomes weaker with a
heavier taxation of newspaper sales, making it optimal to increase sales of
ads. The media rm can achieve this by enlarging the size of the readership,
which requires a reduction of the newspaper price. This implies that the
tendency for the newspaper price to fall subsequent to a tax increase is even
more pronounced when pNa < 0 than when p
N
a = 0:
13 It should be noted,
though, that we still cannot sign the change in the price of advertising if
both the advertising level and the size of the readership increase. This opens
up for the possibly surprising result that the price for both readers and
advertisers fall subsequent to a tax rise, and that the platform bears the full
tax burden.14
Summing up the discussion so far, we can state:
Proposition 1: If pNa  0; a su¢ cient condition for a higher value-
added tax on good N to increase equilibrium quantities of both goods is that
13With pNn < 0 and p
N
a < 0 it follows immediately from equation (4) that dp
N=dt < 0
if da=dt > 0 and dn=dt > 0; and that the price reduction is larger the more consumers
dislike ads.
14Using Anderson and Coates (2005) well-established model of a monopoly newspaper
it is straightforward to show that prices may indeed fall on both sides of the platform.
The computations are available upon request.
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apAn > kn. The price of good N (inclusive of VAT) is lowered, while the sign
of the change in the price of the untaxed good (A) is ambiguous.
Undoubtedly, the market price pN is only part of the total price readers
pay when pNa < 0. The total, hedonic price includes the market price and the
disutility readers incur from advertising exposure. Readers buy more of the
more heavily taxed good when apAn > kn. Appealing to a revealed preference
argument, the rise in advertising volume does not dominate the reduction of
the market price. Hence, not only the market price pN , but also the hedonic
price falls subsequent to the tax rise.
3.3 Newspaper readers as ad-lovers (pNa > 0)
Demand for newspapers is increasing in the advertising level if pNa > 0;
and reects that readers have a positive attitude towards commercials (ad-
lovers): This may be the case in for instance specialized magazines; car ads
in automobile magazines and perfume ads in beauty magazines constitute
examples where the ads seem to be appreciated by the readers (see Depken
II and Wilson, 2004).15
Equations (7) and (8) still hold when consumers are ad lovers, but with
the potentially important di¤erence that the last terms in both equations
turn from positive to negative, that is,
da
dt

pNa >0
=
da
dt

pNa =0
+

1
1 + t
2  z }| {
nnnp
N
a
H
(9)
dn
dt

pNa >0
=
dn
dt

pNa =0
+

1
1 + t
2  z }| {
( annpNa )
H
: (10)
15Another example is from the nancial sector, where cardholders have a higher will-
ingness to pay for holding a credit card the larger the number of merchants that accept
it.
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If pNa > 0 is small, the last term is insignicant relative to the rst term
and our results in the previous sections are reproduced. If pNa is su¢ ciently
high, it follows from equations (9) and (10) that the sales of newspapers and
advertising are decreasing in taxes. To see why, notice that the newspaper
has more ads than the quantity which maximizes prot on the advertising
side when consumers are ad-lovers (c.f. equation (2)). An increase in VAT,
though, implies that it becomes less protable for the media rm to attract
readers by having many ads. Instead, the media rm will have incentives
to reduce the level of advertising, and approach the volume that maximizes
prot on the advertising side. If pNa is su¢ ciently high, both the level of
advertising and newspaper sales will therefore fall, and the signs of dpA=dt
and dpN=dt will be ambiguous (c.f. equation 4).
To summarize:
Proposition 2: Suppose pNa > 0:
(a) If pNa is not too high, a higher value-added tax on good N increases
sales on both sides of the market and lowers the price of good N if apAn > kn.
(b) If pNa is su¢ ciently high, a higher tax on good N reduces sales on
both sides of the market, while the e¤ect on prices is ambiguous.
In the sections above we have shown that a higher ad valorem tax on
newspapers may increase newspaper sales and reduce the newspaper price,
particularly if consumers dislike ads. The purpose of the next section is to
show that it may be a more robust policy recommendation to use negative
specic taxes (unit subsidies) than to reduce the VAT rate if the aim is to
increase newspaper circulation.
4 Specic Taxation
Under a specic tax the prot of the platform is
 = max
n;a

apA(n; a) +

pN(n; a)
1 + t
  

n  k (n; a)

;
13
where  is the specic tax that falls on good N (newspapers). From the
rst order conditions a = 0 and n = 0; we can characterize the prot
maximizing behavior of the platform as follows
pA + apAa   ka =  
npNa
1 + t
(11)

pN + npNn
1 + t

  kn =  apAn +  : (12)
The rst-order conditions for the platform are the same as before (c.f.
equations (2) and (3)), except that the specic tax imposes an additional
cost on the production of newspapers, as is evident from the right-hand side
of (12).
Totally di¤erentiating (11) and (12), holding t xed, we nd
dn
d
=
aa
H
< 0 and
da
d
=  na
H
< 0: (13)
Equation (13) makes it clear that specic taxes unambiguously have a neg-
ative impact on output in both markets, independently of consumer pref-
erences for ads. The reason is that higher specic taxes are equivalent to
increased unit costs, as shown by equation (12). Since higher unit costs lower
the marginal protability for any given output, it is optimal to reduce sales of
newspapers (dn=d < 0). As a result, the advertising level falls (da=d < 0).
Note, however, that we would have da=d > 0 if an < 0: The intuition
for this is simple; if the marginal prot of advertising is decreasing in the
newspaper circulation, a lower sale of newspapers will make it optimal for
the media rm to sell more advertising space. In contrast, the equations in
Section 3 make it clear that the sign of the change in sales of advertising do
not depend critically on whether an is positive or negative under ad valorem
taxation (see also Appendix).
The change in the newspaper price is
dpN
d
=
+z }| {
pNn
dn
d
+
?z}|{
pNa
 z}|{
da
d
. (14)
14
Equation (14) is unambiguously positive if consumers dislike ads (pNa <
0). However, with ad-lovers (pNa > 0) the second term is negative, reecting
that the consumerswillingness to pay for the newspaper falls when the level
of advertising decreases. Unless this e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, we get the
standard result from one-sided markets that the end-user price is increasing
in the tax level (dpN=d > 0).
For the advertising price we nd
dpA
d
=
+z }| {
pAa
da
d
+
 z }| {
pAn
dn
d
: (15)
The fact that the advertising volume falls subsequent to a higher specic tax,
tends to increase the advertising price. However, the smaller newspaper cir-
culation (dn=dt < 0) reduces the value of advertising. If this e¤ect dominates
(i.e., pAn is relatively large), the advertising price falls.
Our result above can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3: A higher specic tax on good N reduces output of both
goods. Unless pAn and p
N
a are positive and su¢ ciently large, end-user prices
increase.
The analysis in Sections 3 and 4 makes it clear that raising ad valorem
taxes and specic taxes may have opposite quantity e¤ects. The reason for
this is that with specic taxes, there is a one-to-one relationship between
tax payments and quantity, while there is no direct link between output and
the burden of taxation under ad valorem taxation. In fact, subsequent to a
higher ad valorem tax the rm can in principle both reduce tax payments
and increase the quantity by lowering the price.
The important insight from the discussion above, is that unit subsidies
(a negative value of ) unquestionably increase newspaper circulation, and
also reduces the newspaper price unless the readers are relatively strong ad-
lovers. A reduction of the VAT rate, on the other hand, has more ambiguous
e¤ects - in the worst case, such a policy may reduce newspaper circulation
and increase newspaper prices.
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As far as we know there does not exist any studies besides ours that
explicitly consider tax incidence in two-sided markets, but in a setting with a
multi-product monopoly Edgeworth (1925) showed that a higher specic tax
on one out of two substitutable goods may reduce the end-user price of both.16
This possibility has later been labelled Edgeworths Taxation Paradox; see
also follow-up contributions by Hotelling (1932), Wicksell (1934) and Bailey
(1954). However, output of the more heavily taxed good falls. In this sense
the "paradox is somewhat less puzzling", as stressed by Salinger (1991, p.
549).17 Since a higher specic tax on a good reduces output of that good also
in our setting, we have a similar "unsurprsing" result in Proposition 3. In
contrast, we have shown that higher ad valorem taxes possibly both reduce
prices and increase output in a two-sided market. It should be noted, though,
that the externalities that arise in a setting with two substitutable goods are
conceptually di¤erent from those arising in two-sided market (Rochet and
Tirole, 2003, 2006).
5 Duopoly and newspaper di¤erentiation
In this section we extend our analysis from monopoly to duopoly. The ex-
tension serves two purposes. First, we would like to know the robustness of
our results if there is competition. Second, given that the analysis pertains
to the newspaper business, it is of interest to investigate if changes in the
ad valorem tax a¤ect how newspapers di¤erentiate themselves with respect
to content such as the editorial stance. Our analysis draws on the model in
16Concretely, Edgeworth considered demand for rst-class and third-class railway tick-
ets. His assessment was that a tax imposed on rst-class tickets may give the railway
company an incentive to reduce the price of the untaxed good - third-class tickets - in
order to sell more of it. Indeed, under certain conditions the price of both types of tick-
ets will fall subsequent to the tax increase. See Creedy (1988) for a good overview and
discussion of the related literature.
17Salinger (1991) uses the logic of the Edgeworth Taxation Paradox to show that mergers
of successive monopolies in multiproduct industries may reduce welfare.
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Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002) extended by taxation and the possibility of
an ad-loving or ad-averse readership. We assume that readers can choose be-
tween two newspapers, which are located on the Hotelling line. The locations
of the newspapers are given by 1 =  and 2 = 1   ; where (1  )  :
The newspapers are perfect (horizontal) substitutes if (1  ) =  , while
they are maximally (horizontally) di¤erentiated if  =  = 0:
Readers di¤er w.r.t. their preference for editorial stance as measured by
; which is uniformly distributed on the unit-interval. The utility of a -type
reader who consumes newspaper i = 1; 2 equals
ui = v    (i   )2   pNi   ai; (16)
where pNi is the price that readers pay per copy of newspaper i and ai is
the advertising volume. The readers su¤er a utility loss at an amount of
 (i   )2,  > 0; when the newspapers editorial content i is distinct from
their most preferred one. Readers may (dis)like advertisements. They feel
disturbed by advertisements when  > 0; and appreciate them when  < 0.
As such pNi + ai can be interpreted as the hedonic price readers pay per
newspaper.18 The parameter v > 0 is assumed to be su¢ ciently large to
ensure market coverage (such that each consumer buys one newspaper).
We express the number of readers of newspaper i; denoted ni; in terms
of the hedonic price pNi + ai. It is clear that ni is a non-increasing function
of pNi + ai; and we dene
ni = (p
N
i + ai);
where @=@
 
pNi + ai
  0:19
Advertisers di¤er w.r.t. the benet they derive from informing readers
about the existence and characteristics of their product. The benet adver-
tisers have when contacting a reader is ; which is distributed on [0; 1] with
18In Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002)  is set to zero.
19For notational simplicity, the hedonic price charged by the rival platform is not listed
as an argument of ():
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density 4k as in Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002). The net benet for a rm of
type  from advertising in newspaper i is
Bi = ni   pAi ; (17)
where pAi is the price for an ad in newspaper i. We assume that the advertisers
are price takers. The induced demand for advertising in newspaper i then
reads20
ai = 4k
 
1  pAi =ni

: (18)
The marginal cost for the newspaper of inserting an ad is set equal to
zero, while the marginal cost of printing and distributing a newspaper copy
is c  0. An ad valorem tax (t) is levied on sales of newspapers (good N);
which implies that the media rm receives the price pN= (1 + t) per sold copy
of the newspaper. This means that the prot level of newspaper i equals
i = p
A
i ai + ni

pNi
1 + t
  c

: (19)
We consider a three-stage game where the newspapers simultaneously and
non-cooperatively choose their editorial stance at stage 1. At stage 2 each
newspaper maximizes prot with respect to the hedonic price, while they
select advertising prices at stage 3.
We focus on subgame-perfect equilibria which exhibit positive newspa-
per prices (otherwise the tax would be neutral for rm behavior). Solving
backwards, at stage 3 each newspaper maximizes prots with respect to pAi
keeping the hedonic price pNi + ai constant. At an interior solution, the
rst-order condition is
ai + p
A
i
@ai
@pAi

+
ni
1 + t
@pNi
@pAi

d(pNi +ai)=0
= 0: (20)
Noting that @ai
@pAi
=  4k
i
and @p
N
i
@pAi

d(pNi +ai)=0
= 4k
i
by (16) and (18), the third-
stage equilibrium advertising price and the associated amount of advertising
20The platform has a monopoly over its readers as an advertiser can only contact a
potential customer who reads newspaper i by placing an advert in that newspaper. Each
newspaper rm is thus a competitive bottleneck; Armstrong (2006).
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is
pAi =

1 +

1 + t

i
2
and ai = 2k

1  
1 + t

: (21)
To ensure that the non-negativity constraints on the advertising price and
quantity are not binding, we impose jj < 1 throughout. Total advertising
revenue for newspaper i is thus given by
pAi ai =
~ki; where ~k := k
"
1 


1 + t
2#
: (22)
Hence, we nd that per-reader advertising revenue ~k is increasing in t
provided  6= 0; i.e.
d~k=dt

 6=0
> 0: (23)
Intuitively, if readers are indi¤erent to ads ( = 0), the exposure to
advertising does not a¤ect revenues collected from readers and, thus, the
newspaper tax does not inuence the choice of advertising price and hence
advertising revenues. If, in contrast, the audience is ad-averse ( > 0), the
newspaper rm incurs a cost of advertising. It recognizes the adverse e¤ect
of advertising on reader utility and per-reader advertising revenues are set
at a lower level than when  = 0 (c.f. equation (21)). Thus, a higher tax
reduces the negative impact of advertising for newspaper revenues and, as
a consequence, per-reader advertising revenues rise. An analogous type of
reasoning applies when readers appreciate ads ( < 0).
At stage 2 newspaper i maximizes prot with respect to the hedonic price
pNi + ai taking into account how advertising levels will be a¤ected at stage
3. Since advertising levels are parametric, newspaper i e¤ectively maximizes
prot with respect to pNi . Formally, it solves p
N
i = argmax i, where
i = ~ki(p
N
i + ai) + i(p
N
i + ai)

pNi
1 + t
  c

; i 6= j: (24)
To determine the size of the readership of newspaper i, i(ui), note that
the willingness to pay for newspaper 1 is greater than for newspaper 2 for all
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consumers satisfying u1 > u2: Together with the previous nding a1 = a2 we
thus nd that demand for the two newspapers is given by
1 = +
pN2   pN1
2 (1    )+
1    
2
and 2 = +
pN1   pN2
2 (1    )+
1    
2
:
(25)
Demand for newspaper i is decreasing in its own price pNi and increasing in
the rival platforms price pNj , i 6= j. More important for our purpose is the fact
that maximization of (24) subject to (25) is equivalent to the optimization
problem in Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002) even though they have set  = 0
and t = 0: If pi > 0, the second stage newspaper prices as a function of the
editorial content choices  and  are
pN1 = p
N
2 = (1 + t)

c  ~k

+  (1    ) (1 +   ) (26)
Following Gabszewicz et al (2001, 2002), the rst stage of the game -
where the newspapers choose their location - yields an equilibrium with full
di¤erentiation ( = 0;  = 0) if21
(1 + t) ~k < (1 + t) c+ =2 , pNi > 0: (27)
Full content di¤erentiation and positive newspaper prices are inherently
linked. With pNi > 0, advertising revenues are passed on to consumers in the
form of reduced newspaper prices. In consequence, prots of the newspaper
platform are independent of advertising receipts. As it only relies on news-
paper receipts, the rm maximally di¤erentiates editorial content in order to
relax competition for newspaper readers (e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1982).22
Having solved for the equilibrium, we are equipped to analyze tax shifting
incentives and the impact of taxes on the di¤erentiation of newspapers. In
21We omit the details of the computations and refer the reader to Gabszewicz et al.
(2001) and, in particular, to Gabszewicz et al. (2002).
22If pi  0 we nd that i = 118 (1 + t) 1 (3 + i   j)2 (1  i   j): This shows that
the prot level is independent of ~k and that the rms will choose maximimal di¤erentiation
(di=di < 0):
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equilibrium the reader market is shared between both platforms. Following
(21) and (26), evaluated at  =  = 0, we nd
dpAi
dt

 6=0
< 0 and
dpNi
dt
=
 d~k
dt
1
1+t
+

c  ~k

 
1
1+t
2 : (28)
From (23) and (28) we nd:
Proposition 4: The ad valorem tax lowers the advertiser price if  6= 0
and keeps it unchanged if  = 0. The consumer price for newspapers drops
if 0 < ~k   c < = (2 (1 + t)).
Intuitively, when readers are ad averse a higher ad valorem tax leads to
less advertising. This attracts more readers and increases revenues. A higher
tax on newspaper revenues absorbs more of the additional income, and the
incentive to increase the advertising price is diluted. As to the newspaper
price, the ad valorem tax works like an increase in the marginal cost c com-
bined with a subsidy on the advertising revenue ~k. When advertising revenues
exceed the marginal cost, the newspaper price will unambiguously drop in
response to a hike in taxes. Since by (23) per-reader advertising revenues may
increase with the tax, the condition ~k > c is only su¢ cient for a negative
response in the newspaper price when  6= 0. The second inequality stated
in Proposition 4 makes sure that ~k is not too high so as to induce a zero
newspaper price.
Hence, we can conclude that there will possibly be no tax shifting onto
newspaper readers or advertisers. Instead, the platform avoids paying taxes
by reducing the tax base pNi ni and increasing advertising receipts p
A
i ai. The
result is akin to the nding in the monopoly model.
To examine how the tax sustains a full-di¤erentiation equilibrium, we
analyze the propensity of taxation to render the non-negativity constraint
on pNi binding. Invoking Proposition 4, we can state:
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dpiN/dt > 0
dpiN/dt < 0
dpiN = 0
c
k
Figure 1: Price Response for  = 0.
Proposition 5: The higher the ad valorem tax, the less likely it is that
the two newspapers maximally di¤erentiate editorial content.
Figure 1 illustrates the nding for  = 0. In this case ~k = k and k > c is
a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a negative price response. Thus, for
any (c; k) combinations above the diagonal line the price response is negative.
Note also, that all (c; k) combinations below the upper line yield a positive
newspaper price where, for a given c, the price is lower the higher is k. From
Proposition 4 it follows that an increase in the ad valorem tax rate has the
e¤ect of further reducing prices only when prices are su¢ ciently low. In this
case the tax eventually renders the non-negativity constraint on newspaper
prices binding. When this happens, the newspaper will only rely on advertis-
ing nancing, and the tax does not a¤ect rm behavior. The newspapers will
then generically not maximally di¤erentiate content; see Gabszewicz et al.
(2001, 2002) and Peitz and Valletti (2008) for analysis of cases with (weakly)
negative newspaper prices.
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To conclude, if the ad valorem tax lowers the newspaper price to con-
sumers, it also has the e¤ect of making newspapers converge with respect to
editorial content. The result is suggestive for the e¤ects of the taxation of
newspapers.
As a nal exercise we analyze rm responses to a specic tax on newspa-
pers. Denoting the tax levied per newspaper sold by  prots are
i = p
A
i ai + ni
 
pNi   c  

;
where, for simplicity, we have set the ad-valorem tax to 0. The specic tax
works like an increase in the marginal cost c. Hence, we may write ec = c+ 
as the e¤ective marginal cost in what follows. It is straightforward to show
that at stage 3 advertising revenues are independent of the newspaper tax
and are given by
pAi ai =
~ki; where ~k := k
 
1  2 :
Also, reiterating stage 1 and 2 of the game and keeping in mind thatec = c+  we nd that the newspaper price becomes
pN1 = p
N
2 = ec  ~k +  (1    ) (1 +   ) ;
and that the condition for a full di¤erentiation equilibrium is
~k < ec+ =2 , pNi > 0:
Thus we nd:
Proposition 6: (a) The specic tax does not a¤ect the advertising price,
but increases the consumer price for newspapers. (b) The higher the specic
tax, the more likely it is that the two newspapers maximally di¤erentiate
editorial content.
Prices will thus not fall with specic taxes, and the newspaper rm will
in general shift part of the tax burden onto the readers. This is familiar
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from one-sided markets. Also, di¤erent to the nding with ad-valorem taxes,
specic taxes unambiguously promote a di¤erentiated newspaper market.
6 Conclusion
Traditional analysis of tax incidence has focused on conventional (one-sided)
markets. In such markets a general insight is that indirect taxes are partly
shifted (or even overshifted) onto consumers, resulting in lower sales of the
taxed good. Our analysis has shown that this result is challenged in a two-
sided market. If demand for the taxed good matters for the quantity sold to
a di¤erent group of customers, the incidence of taxation changes. In a two-
sided market an increase in an ad valorem tax may, under certain conditions,
lead to lower prices for both goods as well as to higher sales. This is in sharp
contrast to our ndings under specic taxation.
We have also shown that taxation may a¤ect media pluralism under
duopoly. In particular we have seen that the higher the ad valorem tax is,
the less likely it is that the two newspapers maximally di¤erentiate editorial
content. The conclusion is the opposite under specic taxation: the higher
the specic tax, the more likely it is that the two newspapers maximally dif-
ferentiate editorial content. Di¤erently, neither ad valorem nor specic taxes
tend to a¤ect di¤erentiation incentives in one-sided markets.
Even though our discussion is related to the media market, we believe
to have used models su¢ ciently general in structure to highlight the most
common mechanisms in two-sided markets. This said, we believe there is still
a need for industry-specic analysis in both theoretical and empirical terms
to identify peculiarities of the respective industries for tax policy design.
7 Appendix
Derivation of the relationship between quantities and ad valorem taxes
We assume that the second order conditions hold with non-negative prices
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and quantities, so that the equilibrium is characterized by rst order condi-
tions (2) and (3). To nd how a higher value-added tax a¤ects prices on the
two sides of the market, we totally di¤erentiate (2) and (3). This yields
aa
da
dt
+ an
dn
dt
=

1
1 + t
2
npNa
an
da
dt
+ nn
dn
dt
=

1
1 + t
2  
pN + npNn

:
Making use of the rst-order condition (3), the e¤ect of the tax on quan-
tities is now given by
da
dt
=

1
1 + t
2 an (1 + t)  apAn   kn+ nnnpNa
H
(29)
and
dn
dt
=  

1
1 + t
2 aa (1 + t)  apAn   kn+ annpNa
H
: (30)
Consequences of relaxing the assumption that na > 0
Di¤erentiating equation (2) or (3) we nd
an =
pNa + np
N
an
1 + t
+ pAn + ap
A
an   kan: (31)
The cross derivative an measures how the marginal protability of selling
advertising space, a; changes if the number of readers increases. In the main
text we have assumed that an > 0; but from (31) it is clear that an < 0 if
for instance kan is su¢ ciently large (such that a higher newspaper circulation
signicantly increases the marginal costs of selling and producing ads).
Suppose that an < 0 and pNa = 0: From equation (5) we see that a
higher ad valorem tax still increases sales of the newspaper and reduces the
corresponding price if apAn   kn > 0 : thus the media rms incentive to sell a
larger number of newspapers in order to shift revenue to the advertising side
is unaltered. However, from equation (6) we nd that da=dt < 0 if an < 0:
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If pNa < 0; we know that there will be less advertising than the volume
which maximizes prot on the advertising side of the market. If the ad val-
orem tax rate on sales of newspapers increases, the media rm will care less
about the revenue it captures directly from the readers (independent of the
sign of an): The second term in equation (7) shows that the media rm
thereby tends to sell more advertising space if t increases. The higher output
of ads might in turn make it optimal for the media rm to reduce newspaper
sales if an < 0, as shown by the second term in (8).
The case where pNa > 0 has a similar interpretation. If consumers are
ad lovers, the newspaper has more ads than the level that maximizes prot
on the advertising side of the market. Independent of the sign on an; the
newspaper will therefore reduce the advertising level if t increases (da=dt <
0). However, a lower advertising level means that the marginal prot of selling
newspapers increases if an < 0; which induces the newspaper to sell more
newspapers (dn=dt > 0).
The e¤ects of assuming an < 0 when we consider specic taxes are
analogous, and seen from equations (13) - (15).
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